🟠 Trump exerts pressure to force US companies back to Venezuela
Most of the oil in the Orinoco belt is extra-heavy sour crude. High viscosity, high sulfur content, requiring diluent blending or upgrading before sale. The selling price is even 10-20% lower than the global oil price, sometimes about ~$20/bbl below Brent. Poor infrastructure + higher operating costs than industry standards -> Venezuela, despite having one of the world's largest reserves, has seen production drop from >3.5mbd at the end of the 20th century to around ~1.1mbd currently.
It is estimated that increasing production by an additional 300–500kbpd would require several years of continuous investment. -> The scenario of increasing ~1mbd involves $15–20B CapEx and significant political risks. Moreover, lower selling prices further worsen IRR.
The profit calculation ( is the simplest, ignoring the uncertainties ) of Venezuela: - Production ~1.1mbd - Domestic consumption ~0.3-0.35mbd Gross revenue: $40/bbl -> ~$11–12B/year, if $50/bbl -> ~$14–15B/year -> Exports ~0.75-0.8mbd. Gross revenue: $40/bbl -> ~$11–12B/year, if $50/bbl -> ~$14–15B/year
The United States does not lack oil, with proved reserves of about 46B barrels and production once reaching ~13.4mbd. The US does not heavily depend on Venezuelan oil; the focus is on controlling China. By 2025, Beijing will import about 450–500kbpd from Venezuela, linked to debts exceeding $10B. Immediately tightening Venezuela's oil supply would slow Beijing's Taiwan invasion efforts.
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🟠 Trump exerts pressure to force US companies back to Venezuela
Most of the oil in the Orinoco belt is extra-heavy sour crude. High viscosity, high sulfur content, requiring diluent blending or upgrading before sale. The selling price is even 10-20% lower than the global oil price, sometimes about ~$20/bbl below Brent.
Poor infrastructure + higher operating costs than industry standards -> Venezuela, despite having one of the world's largest reserves, has seen production drop from >3.5mbd at the end of the 20th century to around ~1.1mbd currently.
It is estimated that increasing production by an additional 300–500kbpd would require several years of continuous investment.
-> The scenario of increasing ~1mbd involves $15–20B CapEx and significant political risks. Moreover, lower selling prices further worsen IRR.
The profit calculation ( is the simplest, ignoring the uncertainties ) of Venezuela:
- Production ~1.1mbd
- Domestic consumption ~0.3-0.35mbd
Gross revenue: $40/bbl -> ~$11–12B/year, if $50/bbl -> ~$14–15B/year
-> Exports ~0.75-0.8mbd. Gross revenue: $40/bbl -> ~$11–12B/year, if $50/bbl -> ~$14–15B/year
The United States does not lack oil, with proved reserves of about 46B barrels and production once reaching ~13.4mbd. The US does not heavily depend on Venezuelan oil; the focus is on controlling China. By 2025, Beijing will import about 450–500kbpd from Venezuela, linked to debts exceeding $10B. Immediately tightening Venezuela's oil supply would slow Beijing's Taiwan invasion efforts.